Friday, January 18, 2013

A Preliminary Eval of the ALgerian Kidnappings from Professor Ely Karmon

GSPC Area of Operations & Pan-Sahel Initiative...
GSPC Area of Operations & Pan-Sahel Initiative nations (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The hostage kidnapping in the Algerian In Amenas gas field - A first evaluation

The goals of the operation

According to most of the media outlets the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb brigade, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is responsible for the hostage taking in the Algerian BP oil facilities in In Amenas. According to the spokesman of Belmokhtar’s brigade quoted by Sahara Media, the kidnapping of the foreigners is in revenge for Algeria’s consent to French use of its airspace for flights headed to Mali.

In the opinion of this author the kidnapping has only indirect connection with the French intervention in Mali, and it was planned many weeks or even months before the incident happened.

Rather the attack is connected with the in fight between the various factions of the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) on the background of the latest developments related to this organization.

It should be recorded that Mokhtar Belmokhtar has been a long time member of AQIM, as head of the southern Sahara unit or katiba, later named the Katibat Moulathamine, or the Masked Brigade.

During the last 4-5 years he has become more of a local warlord acting in this huge deserted Sahel region, on the borders of Mauritania and northern Mali, engaging in narcotics and cigarette smuggling and the lucrative industry of kidnappings of foreign tourists and workers.

He was in conflict with the present emir of AQIM, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (aka. Abelmalek Droukdel), who refused to nominate him as emir.
It was reported that Belmokhtar split from AQIM, or was expelled from the organizations, in the last months of 2012.

In spite of AQIM’s and its allies advances in northern Mali since the military coup there in March 2012, the Algerian military forces have been successful in killing and arresting on its territory some 200 militants and leaders since August 2012.

An operation on August 15, 2012 led to the arrest of the chairman of AQIM's judicial committee, Nacib Tayeb (aka Abderrahmane Abou Ishak Essoufi) as he was headed to a leadership meeting.  In October, Algerian forces killed Bekkai Boualem (aka Khaled El Mig), the head of external relations for al-Qaeda. 
On December 16, Salah Gasmi, AQIM’s number two boss and main spokesman was captured near Bouira.  He was responsible for the group's propaganda and the co-ordination of the various small groups operating in Kabylie and the suspected mastermind of the 2007 suicide bombings in Algiers.  His arrest weakens Droukdel’s leadership.1

Finally, on January 5, 2013 Algerian security forces killed nine terrorists in Keddara, Boumerdes. One of them was identified as Izza Rezki (aka Abou Djaffar) responsible for the finances of the organization.2

It is therefore possible that the main goal of Mokhtar Belmokhtar in this major terrorist operation was to enhance his position in the fight for the leadership of AQIM, and if successful it could have bring him also an important ransom from some of the governments or companies which had citizens among the foreign hostages, to finance his group’s future activities.3

The botched military operation for the freeing of the hostages

It is still early to evaluate the final results of the military operation to free the hostages in the gas facilities.

From the point of view of the Algerian authorities, the most important issue at stake was to hamper any attempt by the terrorists to blow up this important gas field, as gas and oil exports are the main source of revenue for the government. This could explain the decision to act so quickly without perhaps all the necessary intelligence for a successful operation.

The Algerians wanted also to prevent political pressure from foreign governments worried for the fate of their citizens, like Japan and Norway.

Another reason was to show the Algerian people the determination of the government to fight the Islamist terrorists at any price and not show any sign of political weakness after it succeeded “to win” the May 2012 legislative election and contrary to all other Arab regimes to stop the advance of the Islamist wave.

The Algerian military and security services have led a long deadly cruel war against the Islamists since 1992, which has cost the lives of 100-150.000 Algerians.
The death of dozens of hostages, even if it could involve serious diplomatic repercussions, is less important than the stability the Algerian regime whose main goal is survival.

The Algerian military operation, in a huge gas complex were more than 600 people were working, many of them taken hostages, brings to mind the Russian modus operandi against the Chechens barricaded with  hundreds of hostages in the Moscow Dubrovka Theater (October 2002) or the Beslan school hostage crisis (September 2004).


1. “Algeria arrests AQIM 'number two',” Magharebia, December 18, 2012, at http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2012/12/18/feature-03.
2. “Algeria: Aqim Financier Killed in Algeria,” AllAfrica, January 6, 2013 at http://allafrica.com/stories/201301070275.html).
3. It was reported that Belmokhtar secured a €5 million ransom payment in negotiations for the release of Canadian hostages in 2009.


Ely Karmon, Ph.D.
Senior Research Scholar
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and
The Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at
The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)
Herzlyia, Israel
Tel.:   972-9-9527277
Cell.: 972-52-2653306
Fax.: 972-9-9513073, 972-9-7716653
E-mail: ekarmon@idc.ac.il
Web: http://www.ict.org.il/



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