Herewith the executive summary of the Congressional Research Service
's December 7th report:
Summary
Between May 2009 and November 2010, arrests were made for 22 “homegrown,” jihadistinspired
terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States.
Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in
Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little
Rock, AR—and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the
September 11, 2001 terrorist strikes (9/11) through May 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two
resulted in attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent
spike in such activity after May 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny
minority—continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.
This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred
since 9/11. “Homegrown” and “domestic” are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots
perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made thejump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity.
The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist
activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and
intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and
government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement
activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federalagencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for
Congress.
There is an “executive summary” at the beginning that summarizes the report’s findings,
observations, and policy considerations for Congress.
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Executive Summary
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Congressional Research Service 1
Executive Summary
This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred
since 9/11. It discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity.
It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorist activity and describes law enforcement and
intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and
government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement
activities.
The report does not address terrorist activity against the United States conducted by foreigners,such as the airline bombing attempts by Farouk Abdulmutallab (Christmas Day 2009), the
perpetrators of the Transatlantic Airliners plot (August 2006), or the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid(December 2001). Nor does the report address domestic terrorism attributed to violent extremism inspired by right-wing or left-wing ideologies and environmental, animal rights, or anti-abortion
causes.
Specific plots and attacks are described throughout the report to support analytic findings. A full description of each of the post 9/11 cases is provided chronologically in Appendix A of the report. Appendix B describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with
Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress.
Homegrown Jihadi Terrorists: The Problem
“Homegrown” is the term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, permanent legal residents, or visitors radicalized largely
within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate,or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph.
There have been 43 homegrown violent jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since
September 11, 2001 (9/11).1 As part of a much-discussed apparent expansion of terrorist activity in the United States, between May 2009 and November 2010, arrests were made for 22
“homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks. Most of the 2009-2010 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by core members of significant terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.
Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when
compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Homegrown violent jihadists,
some say, possibly lack deep understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making. They
may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in
international organizations. These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent
jihadists from independently engaging in large-scale suicide strikes. Because of this, they may
turn to violence requiring less preparation, such as assaults using firearms.
Throughout this report, numerous plots involving persons indicted by the Department of Justice are discussed. This report does not presume the guilt of indicted individuals in pending federal cases.
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat pose challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting,
preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. It is likely much harder to detect smaller conspiracies that can develop quickly.
How Do People Become Violent Jihadists?
Individuals can become jihadist terrorists by radicalizing and then adopting violence as a tactic.
“Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding extremist, or jihadist beliefs. This activity is not necessarily illegal. For this report, “violent extremism” describes violent action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, “violent extremism” is synonymous with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” In other words, when someone moves from simply believing in jihad to illegally pursuing it via violent methods, he becomes a terrorist. Because the move from belief to violence is so individualized, there is no single path that individuals follow to become full-fledged terrorists.
Intermediaries, social networks, the Internet, and prisons have been cited as playing key roles in the radicalization process. Intermediaries—charismatic individuals—often help persuade
previously law-abiding citizens to radicalize or even become violent jihadists. Social networks,virtual or actual, support and reinforce the decisions individuals make as they embrace violent jihad as does perusal of online materials. While there has been much discussion regarding the powerful influence online jihadist material may have on the formation of terrorists, no consensus has emerged regarding the Web and terrorism. Prisons, seen by some as potential hotbeds of radicalization, have not played a large role in producing homegrown jihadists.
Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots
Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. No workable general
profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has indicted people involved in 43 terrorist plots and attacks since 9/11. According to Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis, these exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and a wide range of capabilities among the plots.
• Endgames: Fourteen plots involved individuals interested in becoming foreign
fighters in conflict zones involving violent jihad abroad. Thirteen plots intended
to use or did use explosives or incendiary devices. Four intended to use or did use
firearms. Twelve attacks and plots incorporated multiple, unspecific, or unique
tactics. Finally, outside of the 43 violent plots, since 9/11, other schemes intended
from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their jihadi
brethren.
• Suicide or Martyrdom: According to publicly available information, only six
plots included individuals who clearly professed interest in killing themselves
while engaged in violent jihad.
• Success of Lone Wolves: Lone wolves conducted all four successful homegrown
attacks since 9/11.
• Divergent Capabilities: Among the 43 homegrown plots since 9/11, the
operational capabilities of participants diverged greatly. Some evinced terrorist
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less
experienced.
Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists
The spate of recent arrests should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting
homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism activity exists within two broad contexts. The
first of these involves addressing radicalization, much of which occurs in the open marketplace of ideas. The second context is more “operational” and encompasses both violent jihadist plots—
largely involving secretive illegal activity—and the police work used to dismantle them. The
latter context, by necessity, also occurs outside of the public’s view. Government efforts to
combat domestic violent jihad straddle both of these arenas.
Preventive Policing
In the post-9/11 environment, the public has expected law enforcement to adopt a proactive
posture in order to disrupt terrorist plots before an attack occurs. Investigative leads about
terrorist plots in the homeland may originate from foreign intelligence sources. But, for the most part, information about homegrown plots is available only through domestic intelligence
activities. In order to proactively gather intelligence, law enforcement has adopted a preventive
policing approach that focuses not just on crime that has occurred, but on the possibility that a crime may be committed in the future.
In this context, a major challenge for law enforcement is gauging how quickly and at what point
individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence so that a terrorist plot can be detected and disrupted. At the federal level, DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have
implemented a forward-leaning approach with a revision to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for
Domestic FBI Operations. 2 The revision, meant to streamline the FBI’s investigations and make
them more proactive, has at its heart a new investigative tool, assessments. These allow for the investigation of individuals or groups without factual predication. The new guidelines have,however, generated some controversy among civil libertarians.
Also critical among the proactive approaches employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of
Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to
use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to email and Internet use. It appears that U.S. law enforcement has effectively exploited the Internet—which radicalizing individuals can mine for information and violent jihadists use while plotting—in its pursuit of terrorists. A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveals that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or email communications to build cases against defendants in at least 12 of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that terrorists and aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet to be a uniformly permissive
environment.
The FBI declined to speak with CRS about its counterterrorism programs, investigative activities, or engagement efforts for this report.
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
State and Local Authorities
The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is
particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved in detecting lone wolves
and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to larger terrorist organizations. Nine years after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. DOJ and the FBI have established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to help coordinate federal, state, and local investigative activities. States and major urban areas have also established intelligence fusion centers with federal agencies, in part to share intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity
Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally
between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers. NSI is in the process of being implemented throughout the country.
Investigative Approaches
To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been
described as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.” These tactics have
long been used in a wide variety of cases but apparently have particular utility in counterterrorism investigations. As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. The use of these techniques has generated public controversy and illustrates a bind that law enforcement faces. It has been charged with preventing homegrown terrorists, but its use of preemptive techniques spawns concern among community members and civil libertarians.
Trust and Partnership
Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize that the prevention of
terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and
Sikh communities. At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to
define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like other Americans, desire to help
prevent another terrorist attack. The concept of building trust through engagement and
partnership is rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement
professionals in the 1990s. Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach,
engage, and partner with Muslim-American communities. From the community angle, several
Arab-, Muslim-, Sikh- and South Asian-American community groups have formed partnerships
with government officials.
Balancing Security and Liberty
Although many public officials support community engagement, significant challenges may exist
in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. Striking a balance between security and liberty—relying on local communities to provide critical information to further proactive policing while simultaneously building trust and preserving the freedoms of community members—is seen as difficult.
Lw enforcement investigative activities and tactics may pose particular complications in partnership building. Especially challenging are law enforcement activities perceived by community members to be unfairly targeting law-abiding citizens or infringing on speech, religion, assembly,or due process rights. The hurdles evident in striking a balance between security and liberty in community engagement is evident in law enforcement efforts to recruit and manage informants—who are essential to many investigations. Some Muslim community activists fear that law enforcement coerces immigrants into becoming informants, especially those with legal problems or those applying for green cards. Others fear that informants target and potentially entice impressionable youth into fictitious terrorist plots. There has also been public discussion of the trustworthiness of informants with criminal backgrounds. CRS analysis of open source reports indicate that confidential informants were used in at least 20 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorism cases. In eight of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a judgment in those cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?
Issues for Congress
Many agencies at all levels of government are engaged in counterterrorism activities; however,
there is no unified strategy, plan, or framework focused on homegrown jihadist terrorism. The
Obama Administration has articulated a broad National Security Strategy, and it continues to
operate with a counterterrorism plan developed in the George W. Bush Administration that is
predominantly focused on the foreign terrorist threat to the United States. The Obama
Administration’s strategy addresses the threat of violent extremism in the United States only in general terms and as part of a broad counterterrorism effort. It may be claimed that the strategy is not intended to include specifics and that fleshing out policy and coordinating efforts is best left to individual executive branch agencies cooperating with one another. However, even among the agencies, apparently no such strategy for combating homegrown jihadist terrorism exists. For many other counterterrorism and homeland security activities—disrupting terrorist travel, combating specific threats such as biological and other weapons of mass destruction—there are discrete strategies that outline specific activities and responsibilities.Congress may opt to consider requiring that the executive branch produce a national strategy,framework, or plan to combat violent extremism domestically. In such a strategy, the following specific issues would likely need to be addressed:
• Identifying Radicalization and Interdicting Attempts at Recruitment: It has
not been entirely settled which agencies have which responsibilities in this area.
• Countering Radicalization: What role is there for government, if any, in
countering radicalization—particularly radical jihadist ideology that is not
necessarily illegal—before it manifests itself in actual violence? Should the
government be in the business of contesting radical ideology and extremist
narratives within the United States?
• Enhancing Domestic Intelligence: According to former and current intelligence
and law enforcement officials, there is no national estimate of domestic terrorist
threats; national domestic intelligence collection plan; nor domestic intelligence
collection requirements, priorities, or coordination.
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Congress may also consider requiring the Director of National Intelligence to examine whether
and how to develop a national domestic intelligence framework....
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