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LODGE NO. 5 OF THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,
by John McNESBY, Trustee Ad Litem; COPPAC, by Michael Lutz, Trustee Ad
Litem; David Byrne; Shawn Carey; Jeffrey Seamon; Les Baker, Appellants
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; Mayor of the City of Philadelphia; Board of Ethics of the City of Philadelphia; J. Shane Creamer, Executive Director of the City of Philadelphia Board of Ethics; William H. Brown; Richard Glazer; Sanjuanita Gonzalez; Phyllis Beck; Michael H. Reed, Members of the City of Philadelphia Board of Ethics.
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; Mayor of the City of Philadelphia; Board of Ethics of the City of Philadelphia; J. Shane Creamer, Executive Director of the City of Philadelphia Board of Ethics; William H. Brown; Richard Glazer; Sanjuanita Gonzalez; Phyllis Beck; Michael H. Reed, Members of the City of Philadelphia Board of Ethics.
Filed Aug. 18, 2014.
Before HARDIMAN, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
*1
In 1951, the Philadelphia City Council enacted a Home Rule Charter which, informed by Philadelphia's
history of political patronage, restricted certain political activities
by city employees. In this appeal we must decide whether one such
restriction, which prevents members of the Philadelphia Police
Department from making contributions to their union's political action
committee, violates the First Amendment. We hold that it does.
I
A
Appellant Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) is an incorporated collective bargaining organization that represents the approximately 6,600 active police officers employed by the City of Philadelphia.
FOP operates a political action committee, Appellant COPPAC, for the
purpose of distributing contributions to candidates for local and state
office. According to FOP's leadership, COPPAC affords police
officers an opportunity to speak on issues of concern with a
“collective voice,” which include departmental interests in “better
equipment, manpower, [and] livable conditions.” A132. COPPAC funds
information campaigns that educate the public about issues important to
the police,
and contributes to political candidates who support the department's
positions on these issues. To date, COPPAC has donated to city, state,
and judicial campaigns.
In this case, FOP, COPPAC, and four police officers (collectively, the FOP Plaintiffs) FN1 challenge the constitutionality of section 10–107(3) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, which prohibits employees of the Philadelphia Police Department from making contributions “for any political purpose.” FN2 351 Pa.Code § 10.10–107(3). As interpreted by its implementing regulation, the Charter prohibits police
officers from making donations “received by a candidate ... for use in
advocating or influencing the election of the candidate,” or providing
donations “received by a political committee, political party, or
partisan political group.” Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 8, § 8 .1(f);
see id. § 8.8.FN3 Accordingly, employees of the Philadelphia Police
Department cannot donate to COPPAC because it uses some of its funds
for partisan political purposes. Notably, the Charter ban applies only
to the police, and does not proscribe political donations made by Philadelphia's other 20,000 employees, the vast majority of whom are represented by organized interests.FN4
COPPAC
presently operates out of an account that contains approximately
$25,000. FOP solicits funds for COPPAC by mail and hosts regular
fundraisers, at which large donors receive so-called “courtesy cards”
from the union that extend “all courtesies of [the] organization” to the
donor. A 139. FOP also endorses candidates for local office and
regularly holds fundraisers for them. The City is concerned that
officers may have inadvertently violated the contribution ban during
these fundraisers, but has indicated that it is willing to forego
enforcement of past transgressions.FN5
*2
The
FOP Plaintiffs maintain that COPPAC's current funds cannot support the
committee's operational costs or effectively advance the union's
political agenda. They claim that COPPAC's relatively meager
account—which has prevented the committee from purchasing expensive
television advertisements and from contributing to candidates'
campaigns—has placed the police
at a competitive disadvantage, especially in labor negotiations where
they compete with other municipal workers. As recent examples, the FOP
Plaintiffs cite instances where FOP has failed to convince legislators
to increase officers' pensions, to prevent an interagency reorganization
that reduced the police department's workload, and to improve officers' working conditions.
The
contribution ban prevents COPPAC from accessing a potentially
significant source of funds-FOP's own members. On May 4, 2006, the Philadelphia
City Council, under the administration of then-Mayor John F. Street,
passed City Bill No. 060181, an ordinance that authorized payroll
deductions for FOP members who elected to contribute to COPPAC. If the
ordinance were implemented, COPPAC could receive funds that are
automatically deducted from officers' paychecks on a biweekly basis.
COPPAC emphasizes that individual contributors would have no ability to
direct who receives their donations because they are distributed at the
discretion of FOP's executive board, which chooses whom to fund.
Although
City Bill No. 060181 remains on the books, the current administration,
under Mayor Michael A. Nutter, refuses to implement it as violative of
the Charter ban. If the ban is lifted, FOP intends to distribute forms
to all recruits on “the first day they would be in attendance” at the police academy, so they may authorize paycheck deductions to COPPAC. A 135.
B
The Charter's contribution ban is but one of many prohibitions that aim to insulate the police
from political influence. In 2006, the Ethics Board issued Regulation
8, which interprets the political restrictions on city employees in the
Charter. While only the police are subject to the contribution ban,
see Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 8, § 8.8, Regulation 8 bars all city
employees from engaging in a wide range of political activities—defined
as “activity directed toward the success or failure of a political
party, candidate, or partisan political group.”
Id. § 8.1(n).FN6
The Ethics Board has construed Regulation 8 to forbid all city
employees from engaging in political activity while on duty, in uniform,
or using city resources; using their authority for any political
purpose; serving on the national, state, or local committee of a
political party; serving as an officer of a partisan political group; or
taking part in the management or affairs of a political party,
campaign, or partisan political group.
See id. §§ 8.3–11.
These restrictions mirror those in the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2),
which prohibits federal employees from taking “an active part in
political management or in political campaigns,” and has withstood
multiple challenges to its constitutionality.
See, e.g.,
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL–CIO (
Letter Carriers ), 413 U.S. 548, 566–67 (1973) (holding that
Congress's interest in maintaining an apolitical bureaucracy justified
the Hatch Act's restrictions on political activity);
United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947) (same);
see also
Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973) (holding, in a companion case to
Letter Carriers, that States may enact Hatch Act-type
restrictions on the political activities of their civil servants). The
FOP Plaintiffs do not challenge these restrictions in this case.
*3
Regulation
8 does not preclude city employees from participating in all forms of
political activity. The Ethics Board has read the regulation as
permitting the right to register and vote in any election; to belong to a
political party or partisan group, but not to the group's political
committee; and to engage in personal political expression “uncoordinated
with a party, candidate, or partisan group.”
See Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 8, §§ 8.12–14.
Most
notably, subpart G of the regulation specifically exempts from
restriction “expression and activity that is not political and not
directed toward the success or failure of a political party, candidate
or partisan political group.”
Id. § 8.17. Accordingly, city employees may publicly express
their opinions on political matters or candidates; sign political
petitions; and attend political rallies, conventions, fundraisers, and
other political events, albeit only as spectators.
Id. § 8.15. Pursuant to this carve-out, police
officers may contribute time and money to nonpolitical organizations
that promote causes they care about. As the District Court found, they
may donate to groups such as the Sierra Club and the National Rifle
Association. Moreover, Regulation 8 does not prohibit city employees
from aggregating their voices in political groups, such as FOP, which
may endorse and fund political candidates, and publicize the groups'
positions on legislative and executive matters.
C
One cannot understand the prohibitions in the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter without reference to its origins and Philadelphia's efforts to combat patronage. In the century preceding the adoption of the 1951 Charter, Philadelphia's
civic government was dominated by political party organizations. The
city's then-powerful Republican Party machine had a stranglehold on
local government, determining who was elected, who was hired, and who
received lucrative government contracts. Because it controlled every
level of government, the machine built a “patronage army” of city
employees, rewarding its own members and subordinates with paid office
positions. Phila. Comm. of Seventy,
The Charter: A History, at 1 (1980) (hereinafter
Charter History ). The machine's reach was so pervasive that citizens' access to basic services, such as street cleaning or police protection, depended on their political support for machine candidates. As one observer summarized, Philadelphia
was “a city of petty crimes, small-time gamblers, and five-and-dime
shakedowns, where too often a citizen's first protection [was] not the
law, the courts or the police, but his ward leader.”
Id. (quoting Dickson Hartwell,
Philadelphia: Corrupt and Not Contented, Collier's, Aug. 7, 1948, at 14).
According to an expert report submitted by the City,FN7 the Charter focused on the police because they were used by machine politicians to control voting. Expert Report by Elliott Shore, at 1 (hereinafter
Shore Report ). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the police
engaged in aggressive get-out-the-vote efforts, voter fraud, and voter
intimidation, often resorting to brute force. For example, police
officers turned a blind eye when “professional repeaters” cast
fraudulent votes, and in some instances, beat those who protested these
practices.
Id. at 3.
*4
Individual
officers who took offense at these excesses had “little choice but to
comply with the wishes of the party—they held their jobs as long as they
toed the line.”
Id. In addition to distributing plum city jobs, the Republican machine taxed “political assessments” against the police
and other city employees. These assessments—forced contributions often
collected directly from the wages of city employees—were levied twice a
year before general and primary elections.
Id. at 2. By the first decade of the 20th century, approximately
94 percent of all city employees paid assessments to the Republican
machine.
The nefarious relationship between Philadelphia's Republican machine and its police
force culminated in September 1917 with the scandal of the “Bloody
Fifth” Ward, where officers beat an opposition candidate, terrorized his
supporters, and killed a detective who attempted to intervene.FN8 The incident led to the arrest of the mayor and the conviction of six police
officers, as well as public outcry for the insulation of the civic
bureaucracy from politics. Amidst these calls for reform, in 1919 the
Pennsylvania Assembly granted Philadelphia a new Charter, which enacted a series of reforms aimed at reducing corruption within government and the police department.FN9 For example, one provision of the 1919 Charter forbade all police
officers from coming within 50 feet of a polling place, except to vote
or when needed to make an arrest, after which the officers were required
to “at once withdraw.” 1919 P.L. 581, Art. XIX, § 23. Another
provision, targeted at the local machine's practice of levying political
assessments, prohibited members of the Philadelphia Police and Fire Departments from making any political contributions—the predecessor of the contribution ban at issue in this case.
Id. One commentator described the purpose of the 1919 Charter's
restrictions, as well as early attempts at civil service regulations,
this way:
The history of the urban police in the early part of the twentieth century is closely entwined with the political history of the city.... Municipal and police corruption scandals profoundly affected police departments as reformers attempted to
neutralize the police from political patronage and to curb police protection of rackets and organized criminal activity....
The first step was to transform the quasi-military bureaucracy of police organizations into a legalistic and technocratic bureaucracy .... It was a way to hold police
accountable to bureaucratic rather than political authority....
Moreover, bureaucratization was a means of insulating the appointment
and promotion of police officers from political patronage by requiring standards of merit.
Shore Report at 5 (quoting Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 Crime & Just. 51, 57 (1992)) (emphases added and internal quotation marks omitted).
Shore Report at 5 (quoting Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 Crime & Just. 51, 57 (1992)) (emphases added and internal quotation marks omitted).
These
efforts in 1919 had only minimal effect, as the patronage system
persisted through the 1940s, and with it, rampant corruption, including
politically sanctioned criminal enterprises facilitated by the police.
Charter History at 4. “A vast three-cornered and intimate alliance was set up [among] police, the corrupt politician and the gangster. Tributes were paid systematically by the privileged law-breaker to certain of the police and divided with certain of the politicians.”
Shore Report at 7–8 (quoting David Harold Kurtzman,
Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, at 97–98 (1935)).
*5
It
appears from the City's reports that the 1919 Charter was ineffective
not because it failed to place adequate restrictions on municipal
employees, but because it retained a weak executive that was subject to
political manipulation.
See, e.g., Charter History at 3. Management was shared by the
mayor, who was popularly elected, and members of the City Council, who
were overwhelmingly selected and endorsed by the Republican machine. The
City Council also retained the authority to appoint the Civil Service
Commission; as a result, any civil service requirements that should have
insulated public employees from political patronage were easily
circumvented, and the restrictions in the 1919 Charter—such as the
prohibition on collecting political assessments—were ignored.
Attempts
at reform were unsuccessful until 1949, when candidates endorsed by the
Republican machine, who had stymied attempts to overhaul the 1919
Charter, were defeated in municipal elections.
Charter History at 10. The Committee responsible for drafting
what would later become the 1951 Home Rule Charter—the document at issue
in this case—was emphatic about the city's need for a strong, popularly
elected executive. It also insisted that the reformed Charter be
approved by the electorate of Philadelphia, so “the city could move away from the discredited 1919 Charter and the depredations of machine politics in the city.”
Id. In addition to enacting structural changes to city
government, the 1951 Charter incorporated its predecessors' controls on
public employees' participation in political activities in an attempt to
move toward cleaner government.
One of the restrictions carried over from the 1919 Charter was section 10–107(3), the ban on political contributions by police
officers that is at issue in this case. The annotation to that section
elaborates the rationale for retaining the ban: “Voluntary contributions
for political purposes are permitted to be made by civil service
employees except that,
because of the nature of their duties, policemen ... may not under any circumstances make any contributions for political purposes.” Ann. to 351 Pa.Code § 10.10–107(3)
(emphasis added). The annotation continues: “[m]erit principles of
government employment require the divorcement of politics from such
employment. They presuppose employment upon merit and not because of
political connections, powers and pressures. They also presuppose that
governmental employment will not serve as a means for political tribute
to maintain political parties and regimes.”
Id.
In addition to the 1951 Home Rule Charter, the City of Philadelphia
and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have instituted a number of other
reforms to promote integrity and professionalism within the police force. The Philadelphia
Civil Service Regulations, which were enacted in 1953, contain detailed
rules as to the hiring, transfer, layoff, and discipline of city
employees. Likewise, Pennsylvania Act 111 of 1968, 43 Pa. Cons.Stat. §§
217.1–10, and the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons.Stat. §§
211.1–13, have enabled police
officers to organize in unions for collective bargaining purposes, with
the result of insulating individual officers from the political
pressure of negotiating their own employment contracts. As the FOP
Plaintiffs observe in their appellate brief, “[n]ow, virtually every
aspect of the working conditions of police officers is subjected to scrutiny by labor arbitrators, the judiciary, and the Civil Service Commission.” FOP Br. at 6.
*6
For its part, the City maintains that police corruption remains a serious concern. As support for this position, the City entered into the record newspaper articles about police and official misconduct, which describe,
inter alia, police
officers disciplined for committing crimes, engaging in drug dealing,
and abusing citizens. One article notes that “corruption on the force
has always been a problem,” and details the Philadelphia Police
Department's ongoing attempts to address the “public's confidence in
the department's ability to rid itself of bad cops.” A333–34. Another
article reports that the department's reputation for integrity was
significantly undermined when twenty-nine officers were convicted of
corruption. The record is replete with articles about the recent trials
and convictions of judges and public employees for fraud, kickbacks, and
extortion.
D
It is important to note that the Charter ban applied originally not only to the police, but also to the fire department. This changed in 2003, however, when the Philadelphia
firefighters' union, in a case remarkably similar to this one,
successfully challenged the ban as an unconstitutional infringement on
its members' First Amendment rights.
Phila. Fire Fighters' Union Local 22, AFL–CIO v. City of Phila., 286 F.Supp.2d 476, 482 (E.D.Pa.2003).
As a result, the union obtained a permanent injunction preventing the
City from disciplining uniformed firefighters who contributed to the
union's political action committee, FIREPAC. The City did not appeal the
decision and no longer enforces the ban against Philadelphia firefighters.
On April 28, 2011, FOP, relying on the
Fire Fighters decision and the City Council's enactment of Bill
No. 060181, demanded that the City initiate payroll deductions to COPPAC
for FOP members. The City responded that the Charter ban remained in
effect against the police despite the
Fire Fighters decision, which it considered distinguishable. The City continues to maintain that the Charter ban is justified against the police in light of the “unique and critically important nature of the duties of the Police Department and its status in the community.” A92. It notes that “[p]olice,
because of their position as guardians of the public safety and
impartial enforcers of the law, must be, and must be perceived to be,
above reproach and shielded from politically-influenced decision
making.”
Id. According to the City, “[s]uch public entanglement in politics, potentially damaging to public trust in police impartiality, is legitimately sought to be avoided by the complete divorcement of the police from financial support of particular candidates.” A93.
E
On
May 18, 2011, after learning that the City intended to enforce
violations of the Charter ban, the FOP Plaintiffs commenced this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, claiming,
inter alia, that the ban violated their First Amendment rights to
political expression and association. The District Court granted the
City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.
Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Phila., No. cv–11–3256, 2013 WL 638615 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 21, 2013).
*7
The District Court determined that the standard set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (
NTEU ), 513 U.S. 454 (1995), controlled, and required the City to establish that “the interests of [police department] members, and of the public, in [police
department] members' political contributions are outweighed by the
City's interest in preventing those contributions' necessary impact on
the actual operation of city government.” 2013 WL 638615, at *4 (citing
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468).
The District Court noted that the ban's impact on speech regarding issues of public concern was mitigated by the fact that police
officers, pursuant to the Charter's implementing regulation, could
still express their views about city government in a nonpartisan way.
Id. at *7. Moreover, “Philadelphia's history of government corruption reveals [the City's concerns] are real and the need for the ban is compelling.”
Id. at * 8. The Court found that while the precise impact of the
ban was unclear, it was a part of comprehensive reforms that played a
role in dismantling the old Republican political machine, curtailing
unchecked political patronage, and rebuilding public confidence in the police department and city government.
Id. at *9. Further, “the record ... does not demonstrate that the
threat of political corruption has been eliminated,” and “corruption
within city government, including within the [police department], remains a major concern.”
Id.
Having
determined that the City established real harms, the Court ruled that
the ban “alleviate[d] these harms in a direct and material way,” and
constituted a “reasonable response to the posited harms.”
Id. at * 10 (quoting
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475–76). It found the ban was narrowly
tailored because the City identified a “means through which the corrupt
patronage was sustained—compelled political contributions from [police department] members—and cut off that source of party control.”
Id. The Court also ruled that the fact that donations to
political candidates would be made by COPPAC did not insulate members of
the police department from political pressure.
Id. Accordingly, it concluded that the Charter ban and its
implementing regulation did not violate the First Amendment rights of
the union and its members.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's summary judgment,
Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir.2003),
and will affirm if the moving party establishes that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
III
This
case presents a narrow question: whether the Charter ban and its
implementing regulation, as applied to the FOP Plaintiffs, violate the
First Amendment. We do not consider the full sweep of activities
potentially restricted by the ban—for instance, whether police
officers may be prohibited from contributing directly to political
candidates. Instead, we review whether the Charter ban, in the context
of the other political activities permitted and prohibited by Regulation
8, may constitutionally bar Philadelphia police officers from making voluntary contributions to a political action committee.
A
*8
As
the City rightly concedes, the Charter ban on political contributions
constitutes a substantial burden on the FOP Plaintiffs' First Amendment
rights.
See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U .S. 1, 21 (1976);
see also
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014)
(plurality opinion) (“There is no right more basic in our democracy
than the right to participate in electing our political leaders.”).
Indeed, “the First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.’
“
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1441 (quoting
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
Limitations on campaign contributions, such as the Charter ban at issue
here, prevent the “symbolic expression of support” evidenced by that
donation.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. Therefore, such restrictions
significantly curtail the exercise of an individual's right to
participate in the electoral process through both political expression
and political association.
See
id. at 44–45.
There is no question that “money amassed from the economic marketplace” has a significant role in funding political speech.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010).
The amount an individual or group spends on political communication
during a campaign necessarily affects “the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. For this reason, political action
committees, such as COPPAC, play an increasingly dominant role in
politics: by pooling funds and voices, they present an opportunity for
individuals to participate effectively in the political process.
Cf.
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985)
( “To say that [plaintiffs'] collective action in pooling their
resources to amplify their voices is not entitled to First Amendment
protection would subordinate the voices of those with modest means as
opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy expensive media
ads with their own resources.”).
Here, the FOP Plaintiffs claim that their inability to contribute to COPPAC has prevented the police
from advocating effectively on issues of concern. They have presented
compelling evidence that the Charter ban has hurt the interests of the police, and that FOP, with its depleted accounts, has been unable to disseminate information or convince legislators of police officers' needs and concerns regarding wages, pension benefits, and working conditions.
B
Because the Charter ban restricts officers' rights to speak on matters of public concern,
see
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983), we review the ban using the framework of
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and
balance “the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
[government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.”
Id. at 568.
*9
In
NTEU, the Supreme Court clarified how courts should apply
Pickering when a restriction operated as an
ex ante prohibition on speech. 513 U.S. at 467.
NTEU involved a provision of the Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. § 501(b),
that prohibited government employees from accepting honoraria for
making speeches or writing articles, without regard to whether the
speech or article was related to the official's duties.
See 513 U.S. at 457. In striking down the honoraria ban, the Court noted that, unlike in
Pickering and its progeny, the statute did “not involve a
post hoc analysis of one employee's speech and its impact on that
employee's public responsibilities,” but rather resulted in a
“wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by a massive
number of potential speakers.”
Id. at 466–67. Because the ban chilled speech before it
occurred, the Court stated “the Government's burden is greater with
respect to this statutory restriction on expression than with respect to
an isolated disciplinary decision.”
Id. at 468. “The Government must show that the interests of
both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future
employees in a broad range of present and future expression are
outweighed by the expression's ‘necessary impact on the actual
operation’ of the Government.”
Id. (quoting
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571). Accordingly,
[w]hen
the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress
past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply
“posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.” It must
demonstrate that the recited harms are
real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a
direct and material way.
Id. at 475 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)) (emphases added).
While the Court in
NTEU recognized that Congress had an “undeniably powerful”
interest in maintaining its employees' administrative integrity, it
deemed the ban “crudely crafted” to serve this interest.
Id. at 477. For example, although payment of honoraria to
higher-ranking officials could create an appearance of impropriety, the
same could not be said of the “vast group of present and future
employees” “with negligible power to confer favor on those who might pay
to hear them speak or to read their articles.”
Id. at 468, 473. Nor had Congress provided any “evidence of
misconduct related to honoraria in the vast rank and file of federal
employees.”
Id. at 472. The Court also questioned Congress's rationale for
applying the honoraria ban to speeches and articles that had nothing to
do with employees' official duties, as well as its justification for
limiting the ban to “expressive activities” when other extracurricular
activities had similar opportunity for abuse.
Id. at 472–74, 475. These inconsistencies, among others, “diminish[ed] the credibility of the Government's rationale.”
Id. at 476.
C
*10
We had occasion to review the Supreme Court's decision in
NTEU in
SwartzweI der v.
McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228 (3d Cir.2002). In that case, we held that the
NTEU rubric applied whenever a “ ‘generally applicable statute or
regulation, as opposed to a particular disciplinary action,’ restricts a
government employee's expression on a matter of public concern.”
Id. at 237 (quoting
Latino Officers Ass'n v. City of New York, 196 F.3d 458, 464 (2d Cir.1999)). We clarified that the
NTEU standard governed even when a law regulated only a narrow category of speech of employees of a single city department—in
Swartzwelder, a municipal order that required employees of the Pittsburgh Police Bureau to obtain permission before testifying as an expert witness in court.
See id.
The Charter ban at issue in this appeal is similarly a “generally applicable statute” that applies to employees of the Philadelphia Police Department. Consistent with
Swartzwelder, we agree with the District Court that
NTEU provides the standard applicable to this case.FN10
Accordingly,
to prevail, the City must make two showings: first, that it has “real,
not merely conjectural” harms; and second, that the ban as applied to
the FOP Plaintiffs addresses these harms in a “direct and material way.”
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475. As we shall explain, we agree with the
District Court that the City has established real harms, but we
disagree with its conclusion that the Charter ban is an appropriately
tailored means of addressing those concerns.
IV
To
demonstrate “real, not merely conjectural” harms, a government must not
only identify legitimate interests, but also provide evidence that
those concerns exist.
Id. at 472 (finding that Congress had failed to show “real” harms
because, while its “interest [was] undeniably powerful,” it failed to
cite evidence of misconduct);
cf.
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000) (“We have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.”).
Here,
the City has articulated four legitimate interests drawn from its
experience with machine politics. First, the City must ensure that the police
enforce the law without bias or favoritism, which includes even the
appearance of “practicing political justice .” City Br. at 26. Second,
it seeks to enable employment and advancement within the Philadelphia Police
Department based on merit, not political affiliation or performance.
Third, the City wishes to protect subordinate employees from having to
support candidates favored by their superiors. And finally, the City has
an interest in maintaining the efficiency and quality of the services
provided by the police.
The
interests identified by the City have longstanding pedigree and have
been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court as justifying the
curtailment of public employee speech.
See, e.g.,
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564;
see also
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (emphasizing the continued validity of
Letter Carriers and its proposition that “there are certain
governmental functions that cannot operate without some restrictions on
particular kinds of speech”);
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611–12; Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 101.
*11
In
Letter Carriers, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a section of the Hatch Act that prohibited federal
employees from taking “an active part in political management or in
political campaigns.” 413 U.S. at 550 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7324(A)(2)). Under that law, federal employees were precluded from,
inter alia, running for political office, organizing a partisan
political campaign, and actively soliciting votes and funds for a
candidate.FN11
Id. at 556.
The
Supreme Court's decision turned on Congress's legitimate interest in
regulating the conduct of its employees: it reasoned that such
restrictions were necessary if government were “to operate effectively
and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in representative
government, and employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from
improper influences.”
Id. at 564. Four interests-which the City echoes in this
case-were particularly pertinent. First, Congress had a generalized
interest in ensuring that federal employees administered the “impartial
execution of the laws” in accordance with congressional, not partisan,
will.
Id. at 565. The Hatch Act's mandate against partisan political
activities “reduce[d] [such] hazards to fair and effective government.”
Id.
Second,
it was important for Congress to maintain a civil service that was
politically neutral in fact and in appearance, “if confidence in the
system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent.”
Id. Relatedly, Congress expressed a legitimate interest in
preventing “the rapidly expanding Government work force [from being]
employed to build a powerful, invincible and perhaps corrupt political
machine.”
Id. The Hatch Act, by barring federal employees from formal
positions in partisan political groups, addressed these concerns because
it precluded parties from “using ... federal employees ... to man
[their] political structure and political campaigns.”
Id. at 565–66.
Finally,
the Court highlighted Congress's interest in ensuring that federal
employees did not feel pressured or coerced, either expressly or
implicitly, to vote or perform political chores “to curry favor with
their superiors rather than act out of their own beliefs.”
Id. at 566. These, the Court held, were “
obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities.”
Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court's recognition of these interests in
Letter Carriers adhered to almost a century of consistent precedent. In
Mitchell, a case whose holding
Letter Carriers “unhesitatingly reaffirm[ed],”
id. at 556, the Supreme Court upheld the Hatch Act's restrictions
against an employee who had neither policymaking authority nor contact
with the public, reasoning that Congress had a legitimate fear of “the
cumulative effect on employee morale of political activity by all
employees who could be induced to participate actively.” 330 U.S. at 101.
Mitchell, in turn, relied on
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882), which permitted
Congress to prohibit political contributions between government
employees. There, the Supreme Court validated Congress's concern that
government favor could be channeled through political connections: “If
contributions ... may be solicited by others in official authority, it
is easy to see that what begins as a request may end as a demand.”
Id. at 374. The
Curtis Court noted that such contributions would “quite as likely
be made ... to avoid a discharge from service, not to exercise a
political privilege.”
Id.
*12
In light of the City's “obviously important interests,”
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564, our inquiry turns to
whether the City has presented adequate evidence of harm connecting
political contributions with systemic corruption by the police. As we summarized in section I.C,
supra, the City has entered into the record over a century of “concrete experience with the evils of the political spoils system.”
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 483 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The City has shown, and the FOP Plaintiffs concede,
that the City's concerns about the connection between police abuse and machine politics were justified when the Home Rule Charter was enacted in 1951.
Over
sixty years later, however, the record is essentially devoid of the
harms that motivated the Charter's passage. To suggest today that there
is a Republican machine that controls Philadelphia
politics would be viewed as absurd by even a casual political observer.
Indeed, with that party having been reduced to a mere 12 percent of
registered voters,FN12 it is now reasonable to conclude that the Democratic Party dominates the city's politics. FN13
Regardless of whether such is the case, the City submitted no evidence
to suggest that the Democratic Party has corrupted, or is attempting to
corrupt, the Philadelphia Police as the Republican Party had done during the first half of the twentieth century.FN14
Further,
the statutory backdrop of the Charter ban has changed significantly
since it was first enacted in 1951. The City now has in place a system
of comprehensive civil service regulations that detail requirements for
civic employment, advancement, and dismissal. Collective bargaining
arrangements further insulate individual officers from the pressure of
negotiating their own employment contracts. Moreover, the City offered
no evidence that FOP's internal mechanisms are linked with hiring and
advancement within the Philadelphia Police Department or that officers are pressured to contribute to political causes supported by FOP.
In fact, the City's only showing of present-day police
corruption consists of articles about “dirty cops” and corrupt
politicians. We recognize that such misconduct by officers and
politicians remains a significant concern. But these problems are of a
completely different nature than those that gave rise to the 1951
Charter. Unlike the systemic corruption that led to the Charter ban, the
City's episodic and individualized evidence shows only that human
frailty affects police officers, just as it affects all walks of life.
Cf.
Wachsman v. City of Dallas, 704 F.2d 160, 167 (5th Cir.1983)
(noting that similar contribution restrictions targeted “such human
traits as personal ambition, greed, fear, and the like”). Thus, while
the City has demonstrated historic harm in spades, its evidence of
recent politically-orchestrated harm is non-existent.
This inadequacy does not, however, render incorrect the District Court's finding that the City satisfied the first prong of
NTEU. A legislature need not, in the absence of concrete evidence
to the contrary, rejustify past harms in light of changed
circumstances.FN15
See, e.g.,
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 n. 9 (2003),
abrogated on other grounds by
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310;
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 567;
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
Courts have taken a cautious approach when reviewing longstanding
restrictions, acknowledging that when regulation has succeeded, it is
often difficult to discover evidence that the targeted abuses continue
to exist.
See
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 457 (2001)
(recognizing the “difficulty of mustering evidence to support
long-enforced statutes” because there is no recent experience absent the
restriction) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 567 (deferring to Congress's
determination of harm, as the Court was “not now in any position to
dispute it”). This is true with corruption, which, given its amorphous
nature, is particularly hard to quantify and prove. As a result,
“judicial restraint is particularly warranted where ... we deal with a
[legislative] judgment that has remained essentially unchanged.”
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162 n. 9.
*13
In
our opinion, the Charter ban warrants such judicial caution: it
addressed real harms at the time of its enactment, was the product of
decades of legislative adjustment, and has remained unchanged for more
than six decades.FN16
Cf.
Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 401 n. 27 (1984)
(noting that the Hatch Act “evolved over a century of governmental
experience with less restrictive alternatives that proved to be
inadequate to maintain the effective operation of government”). This
does not mean that a government may indefinitely restrict its employees'
First Amendment rights by referencing some bygone harm.
Cf.
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1456 (“The absence of such a
prospect today belies the Government's asserted objective of preventing
corruption or its appearance.”). But here, the FOP Plaintiffs have
offered little to dispel the City's concerns. Although civil service
reforms and collective bargaining legislation have significantly altered
the regulatory environment, the FOP Plaintiffs have not shown that the
City's concerns of police partiality and politicized personnel practices are now unfounded.
Moreover,
the City has demonstrated a real risk of future harm. For example,
COPPAC's ability to fund candidates for judicial office may prove to be a
concern, as the police
frequently testify in court and interact with the judicial system.
FOP's practice of distributing “courtesy cards” to large donors also may
threaten public confidence in the police's impartial enforcement of the law: because police
exercise significant discretion in their everyday work, a card that
extends the union's “every courtesy” to its holder may become an
improper ticket to preferential treatment. Similarly, the institution of
paycheck deduction mechanisms—here, City Bill No. 060181—may create
pressure on individual officers to donate to COPPAC, because when
contributions are “solicited by others in official authority ... what
begins as a request may end as a demand.”
Curtis, 106 U.S. at 374.
In
sum, the District Court did not err when it found that the City
identified legitimate interests in the efficiency and integrity of its police. And while there is no recent evidence of systemic political corruption of the police,
the FOP Plaintiffs have failed to dispel the City's legitimate historic
concerns. Accordingly, we conclude that the City has demonstrated
“real, not merely conjectural” harms under
NTEU.
V
This showing of harm does not render the Charter ban constitutional, however, as the City must also satisfy
NTEU's second prong—namely, that the ban will “in fact alleviate [its proposed] harms in a direct and material way.” 513 U.S. at 475 (citation omitted).
While
NTEU did not explicitly establish a tailoring requirement, we
have noted that “such a requirement seems to be implicit in the Court's
discussion.”
Swartzwelder, 297 F.3d at 236. Indeed, in holding unconstitutional the honoraria ban at issue in that case, the
NTEU Court found that the ban was “crudely crafted” and not “a reasonable response to the [government's] posited harms.” 513 U.S. at 475–77;
see also
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1456 (“In the First Amendment
context, fit matters.”). Proper tailoring does not require the
regulation to redress the harm entirely.
See
Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 774 (3d Cir.2000).
But when “the burden comes closer to impairing core first amendment
values, or impairs some given first amendment value more substantially,
the requisite closeness of fit of means and end increases accordingly.”
Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La ., 565 F.2d 295, 300 (5th Cir.1977) (distilling
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976),
Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, and
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548);
see also
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 483–84 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (under
Pickering, “[a]s the magnitude of intrusion on employees' interests rises, so does the Government's burden of justification”).
*14
Traditionally,
contributions are not afforded the same protections as direct forms of
political expression—for example, campaign expenditures—because “the
transformation of contributions into political debates involves speech
by someone other than the contributor.”
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161–62 (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21). “[B]ecause contributions lie
closer to the edges than to the core of political expression,”
restrictions on political contributions are “merely ‘marginal,’ “
id. at 161, and are permissible if the government can show they are “closely drawn” to serve a “sufficiently important interest.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25;
see also
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1437 (adhering to “
Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corresponding distinction in standards of review”).
But
“[e]ven when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny,” it still
requires “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that
represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose
scope is in proportion to the interest served, ... that employs not
necessarily the least restrictive means but ... a means narrowly
tailored to achieve the desired objective.”
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1456–57 (quoting
Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons that follow, we
find that the Charter ban, as implemented and applied in this case, is
poorly tailored to the City's articulated interests. Because the ban is
not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms,”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, it unconstitutionally restricts the FOP Plaintiffs' participation in the political process.
A
The City argues that
Letter Carriers requires us to defer to legislative judgment when
determining whether a restriction on political activity adequately
balances the interests of the government and its employees. As support
for this proposition, it emphasizes the following quotation from
Letter Carriers:
Although
Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so
chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the
obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitations on
partisan political activities now contained in the Hatch Act.
413 U.S. at 564. Several courts, including two other courts of appeals, have relied on this language to uphold regulations prohibiting public employees from contributing directly to political campaigns. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir.2002) (upholding a provision that prohibited employees from giving money to any candidate for mayor or city council); Reeder v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 733 F.2d 543, 547 (8th Cir.1984) (upholding a Missouri statute that prevented police officers from contributing to political campaigns); Wachsman, 704 F.2d at 165 (upholding a provision in Dallas's municipal charter that banned public employees from donating to local candidates).
*15
We decline the City's invitation to read
Letter Carriers as requiring us to abandon the
NTEU fit analysis. The Supreme Court in
Letter Carriers did not simply defer to legislative judgment as
to what constituted appropriate regulation. Instead, after a careful
weighing of the relevant interests, the Court held that Congress had
satisfied the
Pickering analysis. 413 U.S. 564 (quoting
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). Indeed, the Court devoted much
of its analysis to matching the Hatch Act's restrictions to Congress's
interests. It found that Congress had demonstrated how federal
employees' public participation in political campaigns—for example, as a
candidate or the head of a political group—had the direct effect of
creating an appearance of impropriety and of risking that federal
service could be used for political ends.
See id. In essence, Congress had found a proper solution—perhaps
one among many—that created a “sustainable” balance between its concerns
and its employees' First Amendment interests.
Id.; see also
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467 (characterizing the
Letter Carriers decision as an application of the
Pickering balancing test).
Nor does the City's invocation of
Curtis and
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), prove persuasive. In
Curtis, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that prohibited
federal employees from soliciting, receiving, and donating political
contributions to each other. 106 U.S. at 371.
In sustaining the ban, the Court was convinced by Congress's
rationales, reminiscent of those offered here, that “government itself
may be made to furnish indirectly the money to defray the expenses of
keeping the [controlling] political party in power,” and that “a refusal
[to contribute] may lead to putting good men out of the service, [and]
liberal payments may be made the ground for keeping poor ones in.”
Id. at 375. In our view,
Curtis is of limited relevance to this appeal because it was limited to contributions
between employees. In fact, the
Curtis Court was explicit in clarifying that the statute at issue did not “prohibit
all contributions” by federal employees for political purposes, but “simply forbids their receiving from or giving to
each other.”
Id. at 371–72 (emphasis added).
Curtis thus left for another day the consideration of other types
of political contributions, such as those made directly to candidates
and to political action committees.
In
Kelley, the Supreme Court upheld a county regulation that limited the hair length of male police
officers, reasoning that the restriction was justified given the
“overall need for discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity” in the police force. 425 U.S. at 246. In doing so, the Court included broad dicta regarding appropriate restrictions on the police:
[The county] has, in accordance with its well-established duty to keep the peace, placed myriad demands upon the members of the police
force, duties which have no counterpart with respect to the public at
large. Respondent must wear a standard uniform, specific in each detail.
When in uniform he must salute the flag. He may not take an active role
in local political affairs by way of being a party delegate or
contributing or soliciting political contributions. He may not smoke in public.
*16 Id. at 245–46 (emphasis added). The City views the expansive language italicized above as a “fairly clear implication ... that a restriction on contributions would be upheld.” City Br. at 29 (quoting Reeder, 733 F.2d at 548). We disagree, because the dicta cited cannot bear the weight the City places upon it. See Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139–40 (1941) (departing from “[l]oose language” when considering a question “with our eyes open and in the light of full consideration”); cf. McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1447 (declining to be bound by Buckley's anticircumvention holding because the discussion consisted of “three sentences ... that were written without the benefit of full briefing or argument”).
The Eighth Circuit's decision in
Reeder, though it too upheld a ban on contributions by police officers, is similarly distinguishable. The plaintiff in
Reeder, an officer of the Kansas City Police Department, was fired for donating to the campaign of a congressional candidate in Independence, Missouri. 733 F.2d at 545.
He claimed that the ban should not apply to his donation because the
candidate had no connection with local politics or the city's police department.
Id. The Eighth Circuit, citing a similar state court decision,
Pollard v. Board of Police Commissioners, 665 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.1984) (en banc),FN18
rejected this argument, reasoning that the ban was rational given the
close connection between local, state, and federal politics.
See
Pollard, 665 S. W.2d at 340. According to the
Reeder court, a contribution to a federal congressional campaign
might well benefit a Kansas City politician who had “made common cause”
with a federal candidate, 733 F.2d 547 (quoting
Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 340), raising the concern that a politician could “influence for good or ill the career of a city police officer.”
Id.
Unlike
Reeder, this appeal does not involve officers'
direct contributions to political candidates, and thus does not implicate the Eighth Circuit's concerns about
quid pro quo corruption.FN19 The Supreme Court reiterated just last Term that “there is not the same risk of
quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when money flows
through independent actors [such as a political action committee] to a
candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly.”
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1452. “The risk of
quid pro quo corruption is generally applicable only to ‘the
narrow category of money gifts that are directed ... to a candidate or
officeholder.’ “
Id. (quoting
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm' n, 540 U.S. 93, 310 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part));
see also
Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011)
(finding that the intervention of a political action committee that is
independent of a specific candidate breaks the “candidate-funding
circuit”).
*17
Here,
the individual Appellants wish to contribute to COPPAC, a political
action committee that serves as an intermediary between donors and
candidates. As the FOP Plaintiffs emphasize, donors to COPPAC have no
say in how the funds are disbursed because FOP's leadership determines
whether funds are used for information or for political campaigns. In
light of this separation, since
Citizens United, courts of appeals have consistently invalidated restrictions on contributions to political action committees, even under
Buckley's more relaxed standard for restrictions on contributions.
See N.
Y. Progress & Protection PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir.2013) (collecting cases).FN20 For this reason, we are unpersuaded by the City's reliance on the Eighth Circuit's 1984
Reeder decision—and its concern regarding
quid pro quo corruption—to justify the Charter ban's restriction on Appellants' First Amendment rights.
B
As our preceding discussion demonstrates, we face a unique regulatory scheme forged from Philadelphia's experience with political patronage, “at a different point in the development of campaign finance regulation.”
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1447 (reconsidering anew
Buckley's anticircumvention holding in light of current campaign
finance decisions). The FOP Plaintiffs' challenge against the Charter
ban, as implemented by the current regulatory scheme, “thus merits our
plenary consideration.”
Id.
The
Supreme Court has expressed skepticism of political speech restrictions
based on broad anticorruption rationales in recent campaign finance
decisions. Last Term, in
McCutcheon, it reiterated that Congress may take action only to address
quid pro quo corruption and not “the appearance of mere influence or access.”
Id. at 1451. This development, coupled with the Court's increased solicitude for the First Amendment rights of government workers,
see, e.g.,
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967),
requires us to take care in determining that the Charter ban is closely
tailored to the City's aims. Contrary to the District Court, we find
that the lack of fit between the City's purported interests and the
Charter ban renders the restriction an unacceptable response to the
posited harms.
The
District Court held that the contribution ban was a reasonable
regulation, as it was enacted to end the practice of compulsory
political contributions that sustained Philadelphia's
political machine. Despite this conclusion, the City has failed, before
both the District Court and this Court, to cite a single explanation as
to how the contribution ban has directly mitigated its concerns. In
fact, the record demonstrates the exact opposite: the 1919 Charter
contained the same prohibition on political contributions by the police,
but did nothing to undermine the patronage system. Even with the
contribution ban in place, machine politics persisted, as the 1919
Charter's perpetuation of a weak executive enabled the manipulation and
circumvention of its edicts. For that reason, the District Court
expressed uncertainty about the independent impact of the ban:
*18
It
is impossible to determine the degree to which the contributions ban has
reduced and continues to ward off endemic corruption in City Government
and the [Philadelphia Police Department], although the likely answer is that Philadelphia's era of machine politics ended as a result of the
combined effect of several measures, including Civil Service
reforms, laws insulating government administration from political
forces, as well as the challenged ban.
Lodge No. 5, 2013 WL 638615, at * 9 (emphasis added). Similarly, none of the City's expert reports, which discuss the efficacy of the Home Rule Charter, attribute success to the contribution ban. Rather, they point to the Charter's institution of a strong mayoral position—a reform made possible only by the concurrent dismantling of the Republican political machine—and the execution of comprehensive civil service regulations as the strongest reasons for reform. See Charter History at 3; Shore Report at 7. Thus, even if the Charter ban had effect at the time of its enactment—a fact belied by the record—the City now has in place a system of statutory safeguards that more directly address its concerns. In light of these more targeted measures, the Charter ban appears “particularly heavy-handed.” Cf. McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1446.
The City also fails to persuade us why the contribution ban should apply only to the police,
and not to the approximately 20,000 other individuals in its employ.
The record shows that the Republican machine historically extracted
political assessments from all civic employees: the practice was so
pervasive that, in the early 20th century, the machine collected
contributions from 94 percent of the city's workforce.
Shore Report at 2. If the Charter ban's purpose was to end such
compulsory wage contributions, it is unclear why the City would enforce
the ban only against the police. Moreover, the City has made no attempt to show that the Democratic Party's recent dominance in Philadelphia politics was achieved through corruption.
We understand that in certain circumstances, the City may distinguish police officers from other public employees because of their unique role in law enforcement.
Cf.
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 n. 5 (holding, in response to an
equal protection challenge, that the government may single out certain
classes of employees for restrictions on political expression). No other
public role is “charged with the duty to protect life and property,
prevent crime, and preserve the public peace and enforce the laws,” and
the police are the only civic employees entrusted with the legitimate use of lethal force. Note,
The Policeman: Must He Be A SecondClass Citizen With Regard to His First Amendment Rights?,
46 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 536, 538 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For this reason, we and other courts have allowed legislatures to
regulate the police to a greater degree than other civic employees when the restriction serves a meaningful end.
See, e.g.,
Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir.2009) (prohibiting a policewoman from wearing a headscarf, as it would threaten the perception of neutrality);
see also
Kelley, 425 U.S. at 246;
Reeder, 733 F.2d at 547;
Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir.1970) (finding that the need for internal discipline and paramilitary structure distinguishes policemen from other public servants).
*19
Here, however, the City's concern that the police
remain “above reproach,” A92, relates only to its general interest in
the impartial and apolitical provision of its services—a concern that
applies equally to all city employees. The four interests the City has
advanced in this case—unbiased law enforcement, merit-based advancement,
employee protection, and departmental integrity—speak generally to the
efficient operation of civic bureaucracy. Moreover, that the police are involved in public safety does not salvage the City's cause, as Philadelphia
firefighters, who also discharge a critical public safety duty, are not
subject to the Charter ban and can readily contribute to FIREPAC.
Although the City expresses strong interests in this case, its general
power to regulate political expression does not automatically trigger
the “lesser included authority” to ban speech by certain groups; its
“selectivity must itself pass constitutional muster.”
Latino Officers Ass'n, 196 F.3d at 468 (citing
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1970)). Because
the City does not enforce the Charter ban against the balance of its
employees, it must explain why the ban has special significance against
the police. We find that its invocation of historic police
abuse—when the record shows that the contribution ban in fact aimed to
dismantle political assessments levied against almost all of the city's
employees—is insufficient to justify the second-class treatment of the police.
In
lieu of a more precise explanation, the City focuses its appeal on an
amorphous justification for the Charter ban, claiming that the ban is an
integral part of a carefully calibrated, comprehensive scheme that
insulates the police from “
all political activity.” A265 (emphasis added). The City
therefore contends that any change in this carefully designed scheme—for
example, striking down the contribution ban—would lead to the parade of
horribles detailed in its brief.
The
City's argument in this respect is undermined thoroughly by the
under-inclusiveness of the current scheme. As Regulation 8 makes clear,
the police
are hardly removed from politics. Officers, for instance, may engage in
political expression so long as it is not coordinated with a partisan
political group, and they may, among other activities, belong to a
political party, sign political petitions, and attend political events.
They may also contribute time and money to nonpartisan political causes,
including to organizations that advocate issues of concern to the police.
See generally Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 8. Given these exceptions,
the contribution ban alone cannot insulate officers from having to curry
political favor with superiors who might demand that they do so:
although individual officers cannot contribute funds, they can provide
many other resources to advance their superiors' preferred political
causes. The premise of the City's justification, then, is false. Because
police
officers are engaged in politics, the City cannot rest on the vague and
inaccurate notion of insulating them from “all political activity” to
justify the Charter ban.
NTEU demands a more concrete and credible connection between means and ends.
*20
Philadelphia's
scheme also draws an arbitrary distinction between associations of
employees, who are not subject to the Charter restrictions, and
individuals. As the District Court found, police
officers may join groups and associations that advance their political
agendas. Some of those groups, including FOP, endorse candidates for
local elections and contribute to their political campaigns. FOP also
holds fundraisers for these candidates, at which they hand out “courtesy
cards” to large donors—practices also permitted under the regulations.
These concerted acts, more than the activities of any individual
officer, implicate the City's interests in ensuring the impartial
enforcement of the law and in maintaining the public's perception of police integrity. But the City has not explained why it permits the police union (a group perceived to be the collective voice of the police) to engage in such expressive activities, while it precludes individual police
officers (whose involvement is not necessarily representative) from
doing the same. The current scheme, therefore, fails to regulate a
substantial part of the activity that gives rise to the alleged harms.
Cf.
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) (professing
“serious doubts about whether [the government] is, in fact, serving ...
the significant interests which [it] invoke[d]” where the statute was
under-inclusive);
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1979)
(striking down a statute that prohibited the distribution of juvenile
defendants' names because the law did not regulate similar dissemination
via electronic media).
Our analysis is informed by the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency, 56 F.3d 85 (D.C.Cir.1995), which held that an under-inclusive regulation could not survive under
NTEU even though the government had presented a real interest. In
that case, agency employees challenged a regulation that prohibited
expense reimbursement from private sources only for “non-official
appearances”; employees could be reimbursed if their appearance was
approved by the agency. 56 F.3d at 88.
The D.C. Circuit found that this dichotomy between “official” and
“non-official” events undermined the agency's rationale, as the agency's
interest—to curtail the “threat to the integrity of the government
occasioned by employees using their public office for private gain”—was
implicated whether employees' business was official or not.
Id. at 94–95. First, an employee would receive the same
private benefit “whether the agency ‘approve[d]’ [the reimbursement] or
not”; second, officially sanctioned benefits “create[d] a greater
appearance that government employment systematically translates into
social advantage than would the unsanctioned perks of individual
bureaucrats.”
Id. at 95–96. Thus, the regulation, at least based on the agency's articulated interest, could not stand.
Likewise, here FOP's involvement in politics raises the specter of three of the City's four stated harms: ensuring that the police
enforce the law without bias or favoritism; protecting subordinate
employees from currying the political favor of their superiors; and
maintaining the efficiency and quality, both actual and perceived, of
the services provided by the police force. As the strongest proof that the “politicization of the police”
remains a threat, City Br. at 51, the City pointed not to instances of
individual officer misconduct, but to FOP's practice of handing out
courtesy cards and its endorsement and financing of local candidates.
Because the Charter ban applies only to individual officers, it serves
no appreciable function in curbing these purportedly harmful practices.
Furthermore, because FOP's actions are permitted, the ban impedes the
strength of its lawful message by preventing COPPAC from collecting
sufficient funds from willing union members. This is a strange
dichotomy: allowing FOP to participate directly in partisan political
campaigns, while preventing officers from contributing to a political
action committee unaffiliated with any political candidate.
*21
Regardless
of whether more comprehensive restrictions on FOP and officers would be
permissible—a question we need not determine here—the City's
inconsistent treatment of the union and its members fatally erodes its
justifications for the Charter ban. In this respect, the ban operates
differently than those considered by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. The
contribution ban upheld by the Fifth Circuit in
Wachsman was part of a larger scheme that restricted almost all
of city employees' political expression, either in individual or in
collective form. There, the city not only prohibited its employees from
contributing to campaigns, but also mandated that “[n]o employee of the
city or
association of such employees may publicly endorse or actively support candidates.” 704 F.2d at 162 (quoting City Charter of the City of Dallas § 16(b)(1)) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in
Pollard—which was adopted in its entirety by the Eighth Circuit in
Reeder—reasoned that the state's ban on political donations
represented the legislature's determination that a contribution's
“public demonstration of support” was one “a police officer should not make.”
Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 341.
Here, the City is of two minds: Regulation 8 expressly permits a police
officer to make public demonstrations of support, either through his
union or on his own time, while prohibiting him from providing financial
support. It is hard to fathom how the latter is a more pernicious form
of expression than the former.
Cf.
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475 (finding that “[i]mposing a greater
burden on speech than on other off-duty activities assumed to pose the
same threat to the efficiency of the federal service is, at best,
anomalous”). And while the contribution ban may be directed generally at
the problem of money in politics, that rationale cannot save the day,
for the City has not relied upon it in this case.
See
Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 96 (“The
Pickering/NTEU question ... is not whether some conceivable
‘governmental’ interest might be constitutionally advanced by the
regulations; ... we must limit our inquiry to the ‘interests the State
itself asserts.’ ”) (quoting
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993)).
Based
on the foregoing, only the City's third rationale for the
ban—protecting officers from politically motivated practices—has force.
The City contends that officers may be subject to subtle pressures to
contribute to COPPAC, and thus “an officer [may] make[ ] a contribution
based on a desire to please or avoid the displeasure of superior
officers.” A290–91;
see also City Br. at 51–52. As discussed earlier, FOP intends to
encourage new recruits to consent to have funds automatically deducted
from their paychecks and sent to COPPAC, raising the concern that
officers would be forced to donate out of professional obligation
instead of personal belief. If contributing to COPPAC becomes a mark of
an officer's merit, it is possible that these donations could lead to
the City's concern of politically motivated hiring and advancement.
See
Wachsman, 704 F.2d at 175 (finding that the contribution ban
was “reasonably necessary” to protect employees from “undue employee
influence”). While the FOP Plaintiffs insist that the ban is restrictive
and not protective, the City's legitimate goal of shielding employees
may extend to “employees who do not wish to be protected.”
Id.
*22
In
our view, the City's concern is not so much a function of an officer's
ability to make contributions; rather, it is a consequence of the
method by which FOP seeks to extract such donations. The FOP
Plaintiffs brought this suit to compel the City to implement City Bill
No. 060181, a payroll deduction procedure that would enable the union
(and potentially an officer's superiors, who are members of the union)
to facilitate officers' recruitment as COPPAC donors. We understand why
FOP would desire an automatic payroll deduction insofar as it stands to
reason that its inherently coercive nature would probably maximize the
amount of funds it could raise.
Cf.
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009)
(recognizing that “unions face substantial difficulties in collecting
funds for political speech without using payroll deductions”). But if
the City truly cares about insulating its police from such subtle pressures, the solution is within its power: it could repeal City Bill No. 060181.
See id. (“The First Amendment ... does not confer an affirmative
right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining
funds for expression.”). Furthermore, the City could enforce a more
direct restriction in Regulation 8, which prohibits employees from
soliciting contributions at the workplace.
The Supreme Court recently stated in
McCutcheon that a contribution restriction is not “closely drawn”
if there are more targeted alternatives that would serve the
government's interests. 134 S.Ct. at 1458.
There, the Court considered the constitutionality of a provision in the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which capped the total
amount an individual could donate to political candidates and to
political action committees.FN21
Id. at 1442. The government argued that the aggregate cap was
necessary to prevent the circumvention of contribution caps to
individual candidates.
Id. The Court found that the aggregate cap was not adequately
tailored, given the existence of more targeted means to accomplish the
same objective.
Id. at 1458. It placed particular emphasis on three
anticircumvention alternatives. First, it found that restrictions on
transfers between candidates and political committees would more
directly address Congress's concern about circumvention without the
“unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights.
Id. Second, tighter earmarking rules would accomplish the same goal.
Id. at 1458–59. And finally, the Court found that, in the
Internet age, disclosure of the identities of campaign donors provided
robust protections against corruption.
Id. at 1459–60. Likewise here, the possibility of multiple
solutions for the City's stated concerns—for example, the prohibition of
automatic paycheck deductions, or greater enforcement of existing
anti-solicitation measures—bolster our conclusion that the Charter's ban
on contributions to a political action committee is unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.
*23
In sum, the City has not demonstrated that the Charter ban as applied in this case is “closely drawn” to its interests,
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, such that it addresses those interests in a “direct and material way.”
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475. Several features of the current scheme demonstrate that the City has not met these criteria. The ban prevents police
officers from donating to a political action committee unaffiliated
with any political candidate, an act that the Supreme Court has stated
does not implicate concerns of
quid pro quo corruption. Nor has the City shown how the ban has
any causal impact on its stated harms, and the ban is illogically
under-inclusive, permitting many of the harms that the City purportedly
seeks to address. These features, especially given the availability of
less restrictive alternatives, compel us to invalidate the Charter ban.
* * *
We are loath to disturb a component of the Home Rule Charter's legislative scheme, particularly in light of Philadelphia's historic struggles with police
and political corruption and the Charter's centrality to the City's
efforts to foster good government. The City has satisfied its burden
under
NTEU that it has veritable interests in maintaining the integrity and impartiality of its police
force, in promoting merit-based hiring and advancement, in insulating
officers from political pressure, and in ensuring the efficiency and
quality of police services.
But as the
NTEU Court reiterated: “Fear of serious injury cannot alone
justify suppression of free speech and assembly.... To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.”
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475 (quoting
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring)). Despite its valid concerns, the City has not explained
how the Charter ban serves in a direct and material way to address
these harms. Most troubling, the City claims that the ban is part and
parcel of a larger scheme that insulates police officers from all politics, while simultaneously condoning political activities by the police
that have similar, if not more pernicious, implications. Given the lack
of fit between the City's stated objectives and the means selected to
achieve it, we hold the Charter ban unconstitutional.
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