A fresh twist on the "Castle Rule"

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"For a man's house is his castle, et domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium [and each man's home is his safest refuge]." Sir Edward Coke, The Institutes of the Laws of England (1628).

"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be frail - its roof may shake - the wind may blow through it - the storm may enter - the rain may enter - but the King of England cannot enter." William Pitt (1763)
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-KA-00708-COA
JUSTIN VANQUES THOMAS APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/03/2009
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT P. CHAMBERLIN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER AND
SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH
FIVE YEARS OF POST-RELEASE
SUPERVISION AND TO PAY A $5,000 FINE
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 08/30/2011
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., MYERS AND MAXWELL, JJ.
LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1. Justin Thomas was found guilty in the DeSoto County Circuit Court of manslaughter.
He was sentenced to serve fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections followed by five years of post-release supervision and ordered to pay a $5,000
2
fine. Thomas filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative,
a new trial. His motion was denied by the trial court.
¶2. Thomas now appeals, asserting the following issues: (1) the denial of jury instruction
D-12 regarding the Castle Doctrine hindered his right to a fair trial, and (2) the verdict is
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. As we find reversible error in regard to
issue one, issue two will not be discussed.
FACTS
¶3. On March 8, 2008, a fundraising party was being held at the Performing Arts Building
in Southaven, Mississippi. After the party, a crowd gathered in the parking lot and a fist fight ensued. Security attempted to stop the fight but could not. Thomas shot a gun in the air, and the attack stopped. The State and defense each called several witnesses who were in the parking lot on the night of the shooting to testify as to the events that followed. Thomas
chose not to testify at trial.
¶4. Kenetric Randolph testified for the State. He had attended the party and witnessed
Thomas shoot a gun in the air during the fight in the parking lot. Randolph testified that he
thought Thomas was shooting at him or the young men standing with him. Randolph
testified that Thomas immediately ran and got into his car. Randolph and several other men
ran after Thomas and tried to open Thomas’s car doors, but Thomas had locked the doors.
Randolph testified that Thomas began to reload his gun, and Randolph and the other men ran
to the back of the car. He testified no one was in front of the car. Dexter Harris was to
Randolph’s left at the rear of the car. Randolph testified that he then threw a cell phone at
the car in an attempt to break the back window. Thomas then rolled down the driver’s side
window and fired several shots from his car. Two of the shots hit Harris in the chest and
thigh. Harris subsequently died from his wounds. Thomas then drove off. Randolph
testified that Thomas could have fled in the car at any time as nothing was blocking the car’s
path.
¶5. Antonio Jasper testified for the State. He saw Thomas shoot the gun in the air and
then the crowd rush toward Thomas’s car. He stated that the people who knew Thomas
chased him because they wanted to ask him why he had shot the gun. These people were
knocking on the car windows and beating on the trunk. He also went to Thomas’s car. He
stated that security was by Thomas’s car asking everyone to leave since Thomas was armed.
He did not see anyone standing in front of Thomas’s car blocking him from leaving. Jasper
testified that he went back to his car when security told him that the police were on the way.
Jasper did not see Thomas shoot Harris.
¶6. Justin Buckner testified for the defense. Buckner was attacked in the parking lot of
the Performing Arts Building after the party. He stated that he was standing outside after the
party waiting on his ride when a group called “TNT” starting hitting and kicking him. Harris
was in the group. He was relieved when Thomas shot the gun because he thought the men
would have beaten him to death if it had been allowed to continue.
¶7. Grady Green testified for the defense. He testified that he and another friend were
asked to work as security for the party. He testified that a total of four men worked as
security. He was asked to help because he was a friend of the party planner. He was not a
trained security guard. He testified that he tried to break up the crowd in the parking lot after the party, but he was unsuccessful. He recognized the crowd as a group called TNT. He
estimated there were eighteen to twenty people in the group that jumped Buckner. He
testified that Buckner did not do anything to provoke the attack. Green attempted to pull the
men off Buckner, but he was unsuccessful. After Thomas had shot into the air, the crowd
dispersed, and Green helped Buckner inside the building. Green testified that he was grateful
that Thomas had shot the gun because he feared serious harm to Buckner. Green testified
that more than ten men rushed Thomas’s car and surrounded it.
¶8. Quintarus Robinson also served as security for the party. Robinson was not a trained
security guard, but he tried to stop the attack on Buckner. He testified that the only reason
the attack stopped was because Thomas had fired a gun in the air. He testified that he was
relieved when Thomas shot the gun because the attempts to make the men stop attacking
Buckner had failed. He thought that even calling the police would have taken too long.
Robinson testified that after the shots were fired, the crowd ran, and he and Green helped
Buckner inside the building. Robinson testified that he stayed outside and watched the
crowd surround Thomas’s car to the point where Robinson could barely see the car. He
estimated the crowd to be twenty to thirty people. Robinson stated that the men were trying
to open the car doors, hitting and kicking the car, and throwing things at the windows. He
testified that a red car was blocking Thomas’s car. He stated that Thomas “couldn’t just
really just turn around like he wanted to, but there was a little space.”

DISCUSSION
¶10. Thomas argues that the trial court erred in refusing jury instruction D-12, which states:
The killing of Dexter Harris by the act, procurement or omission of Justin
Vanques Thomas, shall be justifiable if committed by Justin Thomas in
resisting any attempt unlawfully to kill Justin Thomas or to commit any felony
upon Justin Thomas, or upon any dwelling, in any occupied vehicle, in any
place of business, in any place of employment or in the immediate premises
thereof in which Justin Thomas was found.
¶11. This instruction tracks the language of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-15
(3) (Rev. 2006), also known as the “Castle Doctrine”:
A person who uses defensive force shall be presumed to have reasonably
feared imminent death or great bodily harm, or the commission of a felony
upon him or another or upon his dwelling, or against a vehicle which he was
occupying, or against his business or place of employment or the immediate
premises of such business or place of employment, if the person against whom
the defensive force was used, was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly
entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, occupied vehicle,
business, place of employment or the immediate premises thereof or if that
person had unlawfully removed or was attempting to unlawfully remove
another against the other person’s will from that dwelling, occupied vehicle,
business, place of employment or the immediate premises thereof and the
person who used defensive force knew or had reason to believe that the
forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred. This
presumption shall not apply if the person against whom defensive force was
used has a right to be in or is a lawful resident or owner of the dwelling,
vehicle, business, place of employment or the immediate premises thereof or
is the lawful resident or owner of the dwelling, vehicle, business, place of
employment or the immediate premises thereof or if the person who uses
defensive force is engaged in unlawful activity . . . .
¶12. The trial court found the instruction was not warranted for two reasons: (1) Thomas
retreated to his vehicle after firing a weapon on someone else’s property, and (2) the trial
judge thought Thomas’s defense was covered by the self-defense jury instruction. Thomas
argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying this instruction because it hindered his ability to present his defense.
¶13. In order to find that jury instruction D-12 should have been given, we must first find
that it had a factual basis in the evidence. To allege a factual basis under the Castle Doctrine, proof of the following two prongs from section 97-3-15 must be presented:
First, under subsection (4), if the defendant is in a place where he had a right
to be, is not the immediate provoker and aggressor, and is not engaged in
unlawful activity, he has no duty to retreat before using defensive force. Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-3-15(4) (Rev. 2006). And second, if the jury finds that any
of the circumstances in subsection (3) are satisfied, the defendant who uses
such defensive force is presumed to have reasonably feared imminent death or
great bodily harm or the commission of a felony upon him. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-3-15(3) (Rev. 2006).
Newell, 49 So. 3d at 74 (¶22).
¶14. Thomas was in a parking lot where he had a right to be when the incident occurred.
A question arises as to whether Thomas could be considered the immediate provoker and
aggressor since he fired a gun in the air. However, we find that a fact question is presented
for the jury as to whether or not the attack on Thomas once he entered his car started a
separate chain of events. “When serious doubt exists as to whether an instruction should be
included, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.” Id. at 74 (¶20) (quoting
Davis v. State, 18 So. 3d 842, 847 (¶15) (Miss. 2009)). We find serious doubt under the facts
of this case. Thomas was entitled to a jury instruction that properly covered his theory of
defense under the Castle Doctrine.
¶15. Next, we must determine whether the proposed instruction was covered elsewhere in
the jury instructions. The State argues that the proposed Castle-Doctrine instruction was
covered by the self-defense instruction. Jury instruction 11, the self-defense instruction,
states:
The Court instructs the Jury that to make a Murder justifiable on the grounds
of self-defense, the danger to the Defendant must be either actual, present and
urgent, or the Defendant must have reasonable grounds to apprehend a design
on the part of the victim to kill him or to do him some great bodily harm; and,
in addition to this, he must have reasonable grounds to apprehend that there is
imminent danger of such design being accomplished. It is for the jury to
determine the reasonableness of the grounds upon which the Defendant acts.
Instruction 16 further instructs the jury on self-defense: “It has always been the law in this
State that a defendant is not deprived of the right to claim self-defense in a slaying even if
he could have avoided the threat to his safety by fleeing.”
¶16. We agree with Thomas that these instructions do not adequately present his theory of
defense. Although the self-defense instruction is similar, it does not specifically address the
commission of a felony against Thomas in his vehicle or whether the crowd was attempting
to remove Thomas unlawfully from the vehicle against his will to cause him harm.
¶17. We find that jury instruction D-12 correctly stated the law and had a foundation in the
evidence. We also find that it was not covered elsewhere in the instructions. Accordingly,
we must reverse the judgment of conviction and sentence and remand this case for a new
trial.
¶18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO DESOTO COUNTY.
GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND RUSSELL, JJ.,
CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., BARNES AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND
IN THE RESULT.