Friday, November 16, 2012

New Report: Vulnerability of the Grid to Terrorism


Date:  Nov. 14, 2012 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Electric Power Grid 'Inherently Vulnerable' to Terrorist Attacks; Report Delayed 
in Classification Review, Will Be Updated
                        
WASHINGTON - The U.S. electric power delivery system is vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks that could cause much more damage to the system than natural disasters 
such as Hurricane Sandy, blacking out large regions of the country for weeks or 
months and costing many billions of dollars, says a newly released report by the 
National Research Council.  

According to the report, the security of the U.S. electric power system is in 
urgent need of attention.  The power grid is inherently vulnerable physically 
because it is spread across hundreds of miles, and many key facilities are 
unguarded.  This vulnerability is exacerbated by a reorganizational shift in the 
mid-1990s, prompted by federal legislation to introduce competition in bulk 
power across the country, resulting in the transmission network being used in 
ways for which it was not designed.  As a result, many parts of the bulk 
high-voltage system are heavily stressed, leaving it especially at risk to 
multiple failures following an attack.  Important pieces of equipment are 
decades old and lack improved technology for sensing and control that could help 
limit outages and their consequences -- not only those caused by a terrorist 
attack but also in the event of natural disasters.

"Power system disruptions experienced to date in the United States, be they from 
natural disasters or malfunctions, have had immense economic impacts," said M. 
Granger Morgan, professor and head of the department of engineering and public 
policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, and chair of the committee 
that wrote the report.  "Considering that a systematically designed and executed 
terrorist attack could cause disruptions even more widespread and of longer 
duration, it is no stretch of the imagination to think that such attacks could 
produce damage costing hundreds of billions of dollars."

The report recommends ways to make the power delivery system less vulnerable to 
attacks, restore power faster after an attack or failure, and make critical 
social services less susceptible even if the delivery of conventional power is 
disrupted.  The report stresses the importance of investment in power system 
research, and notes that the level of actual investment in this research is 
currently much smaller than it should be. 

High-voltage transformers are of particular concern because they are vulnerable 
both from within and from outside the substations where they are located.  These 
transformers are very large, difficult to move, often custom-built, and 
difficult to replace.  Most are no longer made in the United States, and the 
delivery time for new ones could run from months to years.  A promising 
solution, the report says, is to develop, manufacture, and stockpile a family of 
universal recovery transformers that would be smaller and easier to move.  They 
would be less efficient than those normally operated and would only be for 
temporary use, but they could drastically reduce delays in restoring disabled 
electric power systems.  In line with this recommendation, the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security has recently cooperated with the U.S. power industry on the 
RecX program to develop and test a recovery transformer.

There are also critical systems -- communications, sensors, and controls -- that 
are potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks, whether through Internet 
connections or by direct penetration at remote sites.  Any telecommunication 
link that is even partially outside the control of the system operators could be 
an insecure pathway into operations and a threat to the grid.  Cyber security is 
best when connections with the outside world are eliminated, the report says.  
When interconnections are unavoidable, high-quality technical and managerial 
security systems should be in place, including systems that monitor for and help 
avoid operator error or intentional sabotage.

The report states that although it is not reasonable to expect federal support 
for all local and regional planning efforts, DHS and/or the U.S. Department of 
Energy should initiate and fund several model demonstration assessments across 
cities, counties, and states.  These assessments should systematically examine a 
region's vulnerability to extended power outages and develop cost-effective 
strategies that can be adopted to reduce or eventually eliminate such 
vulnerabilities.  Building on the results of these model assessments, DHS should 
develop, test, and disseminate guidelines and tools to assist other cities, 
counties, states, and regions to conduct their own assessments and develop plans 
to reduce vulnerabilities to extended power outages.  To facilitate these 
activities, public policy and legal barriers to communication and collaborative 
planning will need to be addressed.

This report was completed by the National Research Council in the fall of 2007, 
but the sponsoring agency, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, decided at 
that time that the report would be classified in its entirety.  After a formal 
request from the Research Council for an updated security classification review, 
the report was cleared for public release in fall 2012.  A foreword to the 
report, written by Ralph J. Cicerone, president of the National Academy of 
Sciences, and Charles M. Vest, president of the National Academy of Engineering, 
provides details about the delay and says that the key findings of the report 
remain "highly relevant."  The foreword states:

"We regret the long delay in approving this report for public release.  We 
understand the need to safeguard security information that may need to remain 
classified.  But openness is also required to accelerate the progress with 
current technology and implementation of research and development of new 
technology to better protect the nation from terrorism and other threats."

Concurrent with the report's release to the public, a workshop is being planned 
to address changes that have occurred since the report's completion in 2007 and 
where future efforts should be directed to improve grid resilience.

The study was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  The 
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of 
Medicine, and National Research Council make up the National Academies.  They 
are private, independent nonprofit institutions that provide science, 
technology, and health policy advice under a congressional charter.  The 
Research Council is the principal operating agency of the National Academy of 
Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering.  For more information, visit 
http://national-academies.org.  A committee roster follows. 

Contacts:  
Lorin Hancock, Media Relations Officer
Shaquanna Shields, Media Relations Assistant
Office of News and Public Information
202-334-2138; e-mail news@nas.edu



Enhanced by Zemanta

No comments:

Post a Comment